miércoles, 23 de junio de 2010

Chimps, Too, Wage War and Annex Rival Territory

 
John Mitani
AGGRESSION A young male chimp in Uganda’s Kibale National Park leaps on the body of a victim killed in an attack.
 
Every day, John Mitani or a colleague is up at sunrise to check on the action among the chimpanzees at Ngogo, in Uganda’s Kibale National Park. Most days the male chimps behave a lot like frat boys, making a lot of noise or beating each other up. But once every 10 to 14 days, they do something more adult and cooperative: they wage war.A band of males, up to 20 or so, will assemble in single file and move to the edge of their territory. They fall into unusual silence as they penetrate deep into the area controlled by the neighboring group. They tensely scan the treetops and startle at every noise. “It’s quite clear that they are looking for individuals of the other community,” Dr. Mitani says.
When the enemy is encountered, the patrol’s reaction depends on its assessment of the opposing force. If they seem to be outnumbered, members of the patrol will break file and bolt back to home territory. But if a single chimp has wandered into their path, they will attack. Enemy males will be held down, then bitten and battered to death. Females are usually let go, but their babies will be eaten.
These killings have a purpose, but one that did not emerge until after Ngogo chimps’ patrols had been tracked and cataloged for 10 years. The Ngogo group has about 150 chimps and is particularly large, about three times the usual size. And its size makes it unusually aggressive. Its males directed most of their patrols against a chimp group that lived in a region to the northeast of their territory. Last year, the Ngogo chimps stopped patrolling the region and annexed it outright, increasing their home territory by 22 percent, Dr. Mitani said in a report being published Tuesday in Current Biology with his colleagues David P. Watts of Yale University and Sylvia J. Amsler of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. Dr. Mitani is at the University of Michigan.
The objective of the 10-year campaign was clearly to capture territory, the researchers concluded. The Ngogo males could control more fruit trees, their females would have more to eat and so would reproduce faster, and the group would grow larger, stronger and more likely to survive. The chimps’ waging of war is thus “adaptive,” Dr. Mitani and his colleagues concluded, meaning that natural selection has wired the behavior into the chimps’ neural circuitry because it promotes their survival.
Chimpanzee warfare is of particular interest because of the possibility that both humans and chimps inherited an instinct for aggressive territoriality from their joint ancestor who lived some five million years ago. Only two previous cases of chimp warfare have been recorded, neither as clear-cut as the Ngogo case.
In one, a chimp community first observed by Jane Goodall in Tanzania’s Gombe National Park split into two and one group then wiped out the other. But the chimps had been fed bananas, to enable them to be observed, and some primatologists blamed the war on this human intervention. In a second case, in the Mahale Mountains National Park of Tanzania, Toshisada Nishida of Kyoto University noticed that a chimp group had disappeared, presumably killed by its neighbors, but he was not able to witness the killings or find the bodies.
Dr. Mitani’s team has now put a full picture together by following chimps on their patrols, witnessing 18 fatal attacks over 10 years and establishing that the warfare led to annexation of a neighbor’s territory.
The benefits of chimp warfare are clear enough, at least from the perspective of human observers. Through decades of careful work, primatologists have documented the links in a long causal chain, proving for instance that females with access to more fruit trees will bear children faster.
But can the chimps themselves foresee the outcome of their behavior? Do they calculate that if they pick off their neighbors one by one, they will eventually be able to annex their territory, which will raise their females’ fertility and the power of their group? “I find that a difficult argument to sustain because the logical chain seems too deep,” says Richard Wrangham, a chimp expert at Harvard.
A simpler explanation is that the chimps are just innately aggressive toward their neighbors, and that natural selection has shaped them this way because of the survival advantage that will accrue to the winner.
Warfare among human groups that still live by hunting and gathering resembles chimp warfare in several ways. Foragers emphasize raids and ambushes in which few people are killed, yet casualties can mount up with incessant skirmishes. Dr. Wrangham argues that chimps and humans have both inherited a propensity for aggressive territoriality from a chimplike ancestor. Others argue the chimps’ peaceful cousin, the bonobo, is just as plausible a model for the joint ancestor.
Dr. Wrangham’s view is that since gorillas and chimps are so similar, their joint ancestor, which lived some seven million years ago, would have been chimplike and therefore so would the joint ancestor of chimps and humans when they parted ways two million years later. “So I think it’s very reasonable to think this behavior goes back a long way,” he said, referring to the propensity to wage war against one’s own species.
Dr. Mitani, however, is reluctant to infer any genetic link between human and chimp warfare, despite the similarity of purpose, cost and tactics. “It’s just not at all clear to me that these lethal raids are similar sorts of phenomena,” he said. More interesting than warfare, in his view, is the cooperative behavior that makes war possible.
Why do chimps incur the risk and time costs of patrolling into enemy territory when the advantage accrues most evidently to the group? Dr. Mitani invokes the idea of group-level selection — the idea that natural selection can work on groups and favor behaviors, like altruism and cooperation, that benefit the group at the expense of the individual. Selection usually depends only on whether an individual, not a group, leaves more surviving children.
Many biologists are skeptical of group-level selection, saying it could be effective only in cases where there is intense warfare between groups, a reduced rate of selection on individuals, and little interchange of genes between groups. Chimp warfare may be constant and ferocious, fulfilling the first condition, but young females emigrate to neighboring groups to avoid inbreeding. This constant flow of genes would severely weaken any group selective process, Dr. Wrangham said.
Samuel Bowles, an economist at the Santa Fe Institute who has worked out theoretical models of group selection, said the case for it “is pretty strong for humans” but remains an open question in chimpanzees.
Chimp watching is an arduous task since researchers must first get the chimpanzees used to their presence, but without inducements like bananas, which could interfere with their natural behavior. Chimpanzees are immensely powerful, and since they can tear each other apart, they could also make short work of any researcher who incurred their animosity.
“Luckily for us, they haven’t figured out that they are stronger than us,” Dr. Mitani said, explaining that there was no danger in tagging along behind a file of chimps on the warpath. “What’s curious is that after we do gain their trust, we sort of blend into the background and they pretty much ignore us.”

martes, 22 de junio de 2010

El abuelo de Lucy caminaba

Hace 3,6 millones de años
Caminar erguido fue previo a Lucy y los suyos
La región de Afar, en Etiopía, sigue siendo una mina para conocer el origen más remoto de la humanidad. Allí se descubrió a Lucy, un Australopithecus afarensis de 3,2 millones de años de antigüedad. Ahora le ha tocado el turno a “su abuelo”: se ha hallado parte del esqueleto de un individuo de la misma especie, sólo que es 400.000 años mayor.
Sus descubridores, un equipo liderado por Yohannes Haile-Selassie, del Museo de Historia Natural de Cleveland (EE.UU.) le han llamado Kadanuumuu (“gran hombre” en el lenguaje Afar) y aseguran que este homínido ya era capaz de caminar erguido. El hallazgo es de gran importancia, explican en la revista PNAS, ya que el bipedismo es un rasgo característico para los seres humanos y sus parientes extintos, y por ello se va más atrás en el tiempo de lo que se asumía.
En realidad, el primer hueso de Kadanuumuu fue descubierto en 2005, a unos 50 kilómetros al norte de donde se encontró a Lucy. Desde entonces, han ido apareciendo más de 30 huesos adicionales que han permitido hacer la reconstrucción actual.
Aquí vemos el esqueleto de Kadanuumuu, sobre el que se ha hecho el estudio.

lunes, 21 de junio de 2010

Orang-utan language identified


By John Sellers

Borneo's orang-utans
'Play' gestures involved a range of clowning antics, including back rolls, placing objects on the head, and blowing raspberries

Orang-utans communicate intelligently using gestures, researchers have found.
British scientists who spent nine months observing the great apes in three European zoos identified 40 frequently used body language signals. These were employed repeatedly to send messages such as "I want to play", "give it to me", "go away", "follow me", or "stop doing that".
"Play" gestures involved a range of clowning antics, including back rolls, placing objects on the head, and blowing raspberries.
"Nudge and shoo" movements meant an ape wanted to be left alone, while a hand to mouth "begging" gesture requested food.
Other gestures included hitting the ground, hair pulling, biting the air and grabbing.
This was the first study of great ape body language to focus on the intentional meanings of specific gestures. Two scientists from the University of St Andrews observed 28 orang-utans at Twycross Zoo in the UK, Apenheul Primate Park in the Netherlands, and the Durrell trust in Jersey. Their study is reported in the journal Animal Cognition.

PAUTAS DE CONDUCTA HUMANA TAN FIABLES COMO LEYES DE LA FISICA

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Psicología
Lunes, 21 de Junio de 2010 08:25
En un nuevo estudio, unos científicos del Hospital General de Massachusetts describen el hallazgo de patrones matemáticos subyacentes en el modo en que los individuos asignan inconscientemente sus preferencias sobre acercarse o alejarse de cada clase de objeto en su entorno. Estos patrones parecen cumplir los estrictos criterios usados para determinar si algo es una ley científica, y, si en estudios futuros se confirma que los cumplen, quizá podrían ser usados para ayudar al diagnóstico y tratamiento de trastornos psiquiátricos.
Los procesos que se guían por leyes científicas comprobables son importantes en la ciencia por la capacidad que brindan de predecir fenómenos. En la física, hay muchas de estas leyes. Pero es raro encontrarlas en la conducta humana.

Los patrones observados por el equipo del Dr. Hans Breiter parecen describir con notable fiabilidad el conjunto de preferencias inconscientes que tiene un individuo.

En el estudio se llevaron a cabo tres series de experimentos. En todos, se mostró a los participantes, que gozaban de buena salud, una serie de imágenes. Presionando las teclas de un teclado, los participantes podían variar la cantidad de tiempo que dedicaban a contemplar cada imagen.

El primer grupo vio una serie de cuatro rostros humanos: el de un hombre de aspecto corriente, el de una mujer de aspecto corriente, el de un hombre atractivo y el de una mujer atractiva.

Al segundo grupo se le mostró una serie de fotografías cuyo contenido era muy variado, incluyendo niños, comida, deportes, instrumentos musicales, guerra, catástrofes, y utensilios relacionados con la drogadicción.

El tercer grupo vio, en dos días distintos, cuatro imágenes diferentes de comida: dos con alimentos de apariencia normal, una donde la comida tenía una coloración extraña, y una de alimentos crudos y sin preparar. Los participantes estaban hambrientos en uno de los días, mientras que en el otro acababan de comer.

La respuesta de los participantes ante las imágenes se midió determinando si ellos incrementaban, reducían o no cambiaban la cantidad de tiempo dedicada a observar imágenes particulares.

Se apreció la existencia de patrones que incorporan aspectos de tres teorías existentes:

- Evitar resultados negativos motiva más fuertemente a las personas que lograr resultados positivos.

- Los índices de respuesta a distintos estímulos son proporcionales a la cantidad de recompensa atribuida a cada estímulo.

- El valor que se le da a algo depende de si es percibido o no como escaso, aunque sea de manera subjetiva. Por ejemplo, las personas con hambre dan un mayor valor a la comida que las que acaban de comer, algo que resulta fácil de pronosticar.
Scitech News

domingo, 20 de junio de 2010

viernes, 18 de junio de 2010

Confirman Que el Ancestro Común Universal Existió

Hace más de 150 años, Darwin propuso la teoría de la ascendencia común universal, que enlaza todas las formas de vida por una herencia genética compartida, desde los microorganismos unicelulares hasta los seres humanos. Hasta hace poco, esta teoría había estado más allá del alcance de una comprobación formal. Sin embargo, ahora se ha conseguido por fin presentar los resultados de la primera comprobación cuantitativa a gran escala de esta famosa teoría que sustenta a buena parte de la biología evolutiva moderna.


Los resultados del estudio confirman que Darwin estaba en lo cierto desde el principio. En su libro de 1859, "El Origen de las Especies" ("On the Origin of Species"), propuso que "todos los seres orgánicos que han vivido en la Tierra han descendido de alguna forma primordial". Durante el último siglo y medio, ha crecido de manera constante la cantidad de evidencias cualitativas de esta teoría, gracias a las numerosas y sorprendentes formas de transición halladas en el registro fósil, y también a la identificación inequívoca de similitudes biológicas fundamentales a escala molecular.

Sin embargo, recientemente, ha crecido el escepticismo entre algunos biólogos evolutivos quienes han planteado que quizá las relaciones evolutivas entre los organismos vivos no quedan mejor descritas por un único “árbol genealógico evolutivo” sino más bien por múltiples árboles interconectados en una "red genealógica evolutiva".

Hay pruebas moleculares, obtenidas recientemente, que indican que la vida primordial pudo haber sido sometida a una desenfrenada transferencia horizontal de genes, como ocurre con frecuencia hoy en día cuando los organismos unicelulares intercambian genes utilizando otros mecanismos de reproducción que no son los usuales. En ese caso, según argumentan algunos científicos, las primeras relaciones evolutivas fueron semejantes a una red, por lo que es posible que las formas de vida evolucionasen a partir de varios ancestros en vez de sólo uno.

Según el bioquímico Douglas Theobald, eso realmente no importa. Podría ser que la vida se hubiera originado varias veces y de manera independiente unas de otras, algo que la teoría del ancestro común universal permite. Si es así, la teoría sostiene que se produjo un cuello de botella en la evolución, y los descendientes de sólo uno de los grupos primigenios independientes sobrevivieron hasta llegar a nuestros días.

O, por otra parte, también existe la posibilidad de que poblaciones separadas se mezclaran y combinasen con el paso del tiempo, mediante el intercambio de suficientes genes, hasta desembocar en una especie que se convirtió en el ancestro común de todas las formas de vida actuales de la Tierra. De un modo u otro, todas las formas de vida aún estarían genéticamente relacionadas.

Valiéndose de potentes herramientas informáticas y aplicando estadística bayesiana, Theobald ha descubierto que las evidencias respaldan abrumadoramente a la teoría de Darwin de la ascendencia común universal, con independencia del papel de la transferencia horizontal de genes o de los posibles orígenes múltiples de la vida. La ascendencia común universal es millones de veces más probable que cualquier teoría sobre múltiples linajes independientes.

Información adicional en:

jueves, 17 de junio de 2010

Anthropology, Primatology, and the Definition of Culture: Reply to Sperber


Category: Anthropology • Great Apes • Human Evolution • Philosophy of Science • Primatology • Research Blogging
Posted on: June 15, 2010 8:30 AM, by EMJ
Chimpanzees have culture (or not) depending on your definition.
Image: Irish Wildcat / Creative Commons

Author's Note: The following is an expansion on my reply to anthropologist Dan Sperber on the PLoS ONE article "Prestige Affects Cultural Learning in Chimpanzees."
Culture is like art or pornography, it's hard for people to define but everyone knows it when they see it. Cultural anthropologists have long struggled to develop a consistent definition of the very thing that they study, a problem that has resulted in bitter arguments between scholars that, to an outsider, may seem as esoteric as church doctrinal disputes over how many angels can sit upon the point of a needle.
In his 1959 book The Evolution of Culture anthropologist Leslie White famously defined culture as "the extra-somatic means of adaptation for the human organism." His goal was to bring some consistency to a field that had 164 separate definitions of "culture" being used interchangeably in the anthropological literature (which, predictably, made cross-cultural comparisons challenging at best). Today, this view has expanded beyond the human animal and a widely accepted definition is from Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd's celebrated work Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution:
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission. By information, we mean any kind of mental state, conscious or not, that is
acquired or modified by social learning, and affects behavior.
Earlier I reported on a new study in PLoS ONE by Victoria Horner, Darby Proctor, Kristin E. Bonnie, Andrew Whiten, and Frans de Waal that found chimpanzees will adopt novel behaviors after watching them performed by high-ranking members of their group. The authors concluded that these findings demonstrate "prestige-based cultural transmission" for the first time in nonhuman animals. Their results were consistent with Richerson and Boyd's definition of culture as well as their argument that:
[N]atural selection has shaped the psychology of social learning so that we are predisposed to imitate people with prestige and material well-being. . . [M]any phenomena, ranging from maladaptive fads and fashions to group-functional religious beliefs to symbolically marked boundaries between groups, might result from the properties of prestige bias.
However, French anthropologist Dan Sperber (Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute, CNRS and 2009 recipient of the Claude Levi-Strauss Prize in Social Science) has recently challenged these findings in chimpanzees and insists that it does not represent cultural transmission at all. In a critique, following from his work in linguistic anthropology, he suggests that humans alone are capable of culture. However, just like in anthropology's past, his conclusions rest on the definition that he prefers to use.
Responding to the study at PLoS ONE Sperber states:
Talking of prestige among the chimpanzees, who don't gossip about one another, extends the idea of prestige to that of being seen as superior. This then supports the prestige bias thesis only if, in that thesis, prestige does not mean more than this. In other words what it supports is at best a diluted thesis where the ordinary or the sociological notion of prestige plays no role at all.
In other words, because chimpanzees don't use language to gossip about one another, it doesn't fit the definition of prestige and therefore isn't a genuine example of cultural transmission. Sperber then goes on to state that the variables of age and rank were not properly accounted for and argues that the third criteria of prestige in this study (chimps with previous experience introducing novel behaviors) brings with it a "risk of circularity":
We don't know what factor had helped an individual chimp to introduce novel behaviors in the past (imagine, for the sake of argument that it was something about her smell), and so it can be that same factor that explains her doing it successfully again.
There are a number of things wrong with this argument (some of which Horner et al. have responded to). First off, Sperber's insistence that prestige is limited to populations who "gossip about one another" (i.e. humans) doesn't take into account the amount of information that can be conveyed non-verbally. Chimpanzees are highly social and utilize grooming in much the same way humans use conversation. British anthropologist Robin Dunbar measured the number of individuals in the average human clique and estimated that human gossip was almost three times as efficient a bonding mechanism as chimpanzee grooming (he later expanded this hypothesis in his book Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language). His argument was that human gossip evolved out of the same social utility that grooming served in our common ancestors with chimpanzees. However, in a reanalysis of Dunbar's data by Japanese primatologist Michio Nakamura, he estimated that:
Chimpanzees can obtain about the same efficiency as humans in terms of quantity of social interactions because their grooming is often mutual and polyadic [involving three or more individuals].
In other words, the amount of social bonding that Sperber insists can only occur through gossip can be achieved nearly as well through nonverbal grooming behavior.
Second, it's difficult to understand how Sperber could object that Horner et al. didn't separate the variables of age and rank considering that research on prestige in human societies doesn't separate these variables either. Both are intertwined in the anthropological literature and contribute to the prestige of an individual within a given society.
For example, anthropologist Allyn Stearman wrote of the Yuquí foragers in eastern Bolivia:
The Yuquí concept of leadership and prestige . . . consists of (1) being saya [upper caste], (2) being a good hunter and therefore provider of meat to the band, (3) having senior status based on age (but only relative to the ages of the rest of the band), and (4) possessing a certain charisma in terms of an aggressive personality and ability to deal with peers.
Elsie Begler, in her analysis of egalitarian societies, likewise found age and rank to be intertwined:
Age almost invariably provides the basis for a system of ranked statuses, whether appearing as formal age-grades, or simply being recognized informally as stages through which a person passes in the course of his/her life.
Finally, Joe Henrich and Francisco Gil-White, the same researchers cited by Horner et al. as an example of denying prestige in nonhuman animals, likewise linked age and rank together in their definition:
Age is a proxy for skill/knowledge/success; the longer someone has lived, the more and better skills/knowledge he/she has likely accumulated. Simply living longer is a complex "skill" with acquirable components. Deference toward elders allows proximity and thereby promotes the acquisition of useful information. This reasoning predicts a general correlation between age and prestige, and also that elderly individuals will maintain their status well past their prime.
If Sperber accepts this multifaceted understanding of prestige for human societies it would be hypocritical to object when the same standard is applied to nonhumans.
Furthermore, the suggestion that there was "circularity" in the study because Model A in both groups had previously been observed introducing novel behaviors can't be taken as a serious objection. The purpose of the experiment was to determine whether novel behaviors were adopted because of prestige or because they were more effective. In the experiment both high-ranking Model A and low-ranking Model B received a food reward after placing a token in their respective containers, so the only reason to follow one versus the other was the social prestige of the model. What Sperber calls introducing bias was actually the variable the researchers were interested in studying.
These methodological critiques suggest that Sperber may not have a great deal of familiarity with primates or the primate literature. An additional example of this is his suggestion that "something about her smell" may have influenced the decision to follow Model A versus Model B. Atsushi Matsui and colleages have recently shown that there are no significant differences in the number of functional olfactory receptor genes between marmosets, macaques, and the hominoids (see Jerry Coyne's blog for a review). Humans and chimpanzees have nearly identical numbers of intact or truncated OR genes (396 in humans compared to 399 in chimps) and both species use olfaction in largely the same way. Furthermore, as Horner et al. reported, there were no threat displays by the chimpanzee models nor unusual vocalizations during the experiment that would have influenced other members of the group. The researchers further controlled for the color and appearance of the containers by using two separate groups and reversing the container used in each. In both groups it was the prestigious chimp alone who influenced others to follow her lead.
Sperber has shown this unfamiliarity with the nonhuman literature before. In his critique of Richerson and Boyd's Not By Genes Alone he made this rather shocking claim:
In non-human animals, relatively little information if any is acquired by social learning. Humans on the other hand owe much of their information to others.
This is profoundly wrong. There isn't space to do an adequate literature review of the many examples of social learning in nonhuman animals (but see the edited volume Social Learning in Animals for an excellent overview). However considering that Sperber's area of expertise is cultural linguistics I will cite a few sources that he ought to be made aware of: "Vocal Learning in Mammals" (Janik and Slater, 1998), "The Evolution of Vocal Learning Systems in Birds" (Farries and Perkel, 1997), "Social Communication in Whales and Dolphins" (Tyack, 2009), "The Different Roles of Social Learning in Vocal Communication" (Janik and Slater, 2000), "Social Processes in Communication and Cognition in Callitrichid Monkeys: A Review" (Snowdon, 2001), "How Can We Know the Dancer From the Dance?: The Dynamic Nature of African Great Ape Social Communication" (King, 2003), "Ethological Studies of Chimpanzee Vocal Behavior" (Mitani and Wrangham, 1996), "Geographic Variation in the Calls of Wild Chimpanzees: A Reassessment" (Mitani, Hunley, and Murdoch, 1999), and "Dialects in Wild Chimpanzees?" (Mitani et al., 2005). This is, of course, just a partial sample of studies that identified social learning in vocal communication. Including other forms of social behavior would result in a great deal more.
Given all of this, I don't think the primary disagreement Sperber had with Horner et al.'s paper was its methodology. Rather, I suspect that his objection comes from the definition of culture that he prefers and the kind of cultural anthropology that he studies. Sperber is perhaps best known for his work with linguist Deirdre Wilson on the mechanisms of communication, what he refers to as the "epidemiology of representations." These microprocesses involve the subtleties of human language that, by definition, would exclude any species that doesn't have the linguistic complexity of humans.
It is from this perspective that he challenged the definition of culture as "information capable of affecting individuals' behavior" presented by Richerson and Boyd and insisted that:
To explain culture so understood, the object of study must be the overall flow of information among humans, through its mental and public implementations; the question that must be answered is what causes some of [sic] causal chains to extend more than others in time and space and to stabilize better than others the contents they vehiculate. For this, the study of culture must be embedded in a more general epidemiology of representations and practices that attends--as does medical epidemiology--to the complexities of both individual and ecological mechanisms.
I admire a good deal of what Sperber has to offer in seeking to understand the complexities of human culture (and we share a common objection to Richard Dawkins' meme theory), but in this case he appears to be using an unnecessarily narrow definition that would restrict any species but humans from demonstrating cultural behavior.
References:
Horner, V., Proctor, D., Bonnie, K., Whiten, A., & de Waal, F. (2010). Prestige Affects Cultural Learning in Chimpanzees PLoS ONE, 5 (5) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0010625
Richerson, P. & Boyd, R. (2005). Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Dunbar, R., Duncan, N., & Nettle, D. (1995). Size and Structure of Freely Forming Conversational Groups Human Nature, 6 (1), 67-78. DOI: 10.1007/BF02734136
Nakamura, M. (2000). Is Human Conversation More Efficient Than Chimpanzee Grooming? Human Nature, 11 (3), 281-297. DOI: 10.1007/s12110-000-1014-2
Stearman, A. (1989). Yuquí Foragers in the Bolivian Amazon: Subsistence Strategies, Prestige, and Leadership in an Acculturating Society Journal of Anthropological Research, 45 (2), 219-244. Permalink
Begler, E. (1978). Sex, Status, and Authority in Egalitarian Society American Anthropologist, 80 (3), 571-588. Permalink
Henrich, J. (2001). The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission Evolution and Human Behavior, 22 (3), 165-196. DOI: 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00071-4
Matsui, A., Go, Y., & Niimura, Y. (2010). Degeneration of Olfactory Receptor Gene Repertories in Primates: No Direct Link to Full Trichromatic Vision Molecular Biology and Evolution, 27 (5), 1192-1200. DOI: 10.1093/molbev/msq003
Sperber, D. & Claidière, N. (2008). Defining and Explaining Culture (Comments on Richerson and Boyd, Not By Genes Alone) Biology and Philosophy 23, 283-292. Permalink